Building on fairness heuristic theory, fairness theory, and trust development models, we argue that unfairly enacted procedures decrease followers' trust in the authority particularly when authorities have high power over their followers. Moreover, we expected trust to mediate procedural fairness effects on followers' attitudes (authorities' legitimacy and charisma attributed to authorities) and organizational citizenship behavior. Procedural fairness effects on these variables, as mediated by trust, should therefore also be stronger when authority power is high. The results of a single-and multisource field study and a laboratory experiment supported these predictions. These studies support the role of authority power as a theoretically and practically relevant moderator of procedural fairness effects and show that its effectiveness is explained through trust in authorities.
When authorities enact procedures in a fair manner, it positively impacts a number of perceptions of supervisors as well as behaviors aimed at helping one's work group and organization. For example, procedural fairness increases employees' trust in their supervisors and improves perceptions of supervisor legitimacy. Moreover, being treated in a procedurally fair manner encourages employees to engage in extrarole behaviors that help improve group and organizational performance (organizational citizenship behavior [OCB] ; for meta-analyses, see Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Yee, 2001) .
One important reason suggested for why procedural fairness has such a pervasive impact is that it addresses basic human concerns relating to power abuse and exploitation (Lind, 2001; Thibaut & Walker, 1975) . To test this idea, the present research identified authority power as a moderator of procedural fairness effects on a number of theoretically and practically relevant outcomes: perceptions of authorities' legitimacy, charisma attributed to authorities, and employees' OCB. Moreover, to clarify why authority power moderates these procedural fairness effects, we studied the mediating role of trust in authorities in this process. In sum, we predicted a moderated mediation model in which trust mediates the effects of procedural fairness (as moderated by authority power) on our outcomes of interest (see Figure 1 for a visual representation of the model). The present research thus (a) extends the procedural fairness literature by identifying a theoretically relevant boundary condition and underlying process for procedural fairness effects, and (b) has practical implications for managers in terms of when fair procedures are likely to be effective.
In line with established views on power, we define an actor's power over a target as this actor's ability to influence the target's behavior in the preferred direction, even if the target wishes to resist such influence attempts. This ability derives from targets' dependence on what actors control, such as money, information, or negative outcomes, such as punishment (e.g., Emerson, 1962; French & Raven, 1959; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003) .
Previous work that has examined the interplay between procedural fairness and power has used (proxies of) follower power such as followers' decision-making control (Johnson, Korsgaard, & Sapienza, 2002; Korsgaard, Schweiger, & Sapienza, 1995) and organizational level (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2006; Begley, Lee, & Hui, 2006) as moderators of procedural fairness effects. These studies demonstrated that procedural fairness generally has stronger effects on job attitudes and behaviors when followers have low power. This is presumably because fair procedures suggest that low-power followers' outcomes will be positive in the long term, thus promoting a sense of control among these followers in their relationships with authorities (Thibaut & Walker, 1975) . Furthermore, the fairness of organizational procedures may be informative of power abuse by top management, particularly among lower level organization members because such organization members lack direct information about top management's intentions and behavior (Begley et al., 2006) .
We sought to extend the emerging literature integrating power and procedural fairness in a number of ways. First, no prior work has addressed how authority power moderates procedural fairness effects. Prior work has focused on a sense of control that followers derive from fairly enacted procedures (e.g., Aquino et al., 2006; Korsgaard et al., 1995) . In contrast, we focused on followers' acceptance of vulnerability as a function of whether they hold authorities accountable for the enacted procedures. Our research thus tested a unique theoretical model and drew on different theory than prior work. Specifically, we drew on fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 2001 ) and fairness theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001 ) to argue that procedural fairness has a stronger influence on trust in the authority as well as on perceptions of the authority and follower OCB when the authority has high power.
Second, prior work has studied direct moderated effects involving follower power on procedural fairness outcomes. In contrast, we integrated insights from the above-mentioned theoretical frameworks to develop and test a moderated mediation model that links the interaction between procedural fairness and authority power on followers' perceptions of the authority as legitimate and charismatic, as well as follower OCB, through the mediating mechanism of trust in the authority. Trust refers to acceptance of vulnerability out of positive expectations of the other's intentions (e.g., Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998) . Hence, an analysis of authority power as a moderator of procedural fairness effects arguably should involve trust in the authority.
Third, unlike previous work, our theoretical argument also allowed us to derive specific predictions regarding the relative effects of procedural fairness versus unfairness (as moderated by authority power) on our variables of interest. This enabled us to explicitly integrate recent theoretical work on trust development into our argument (e.g., Kramer, 2009; Weber, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2005; see McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998 , for an early framework). On the basis of this work, we argue that followers generally have high trust in authorities but that unfairness decreases trust in high-power authorities and, consequently, perceptions of the authority as legitimate and charismatic, as well as follower OCB.
Theoretical Background
Fairness heuristic theory notes that people, in their interaction with organization authorities, face a fundamental social dilemma (Lind, 2001 ; see also Kramer, 1996) . This dilemma results because organization memberships offer a sense of identity and belongingness, and opportunities for improved outcomes: Trusting others, including organizational authorities, results in better outcomes than keeping to oneself (Kramer, 2009 ). However, organization memberships also include possible exploitation and identity damage by abusive or rejecting authorities. This is a reason to distrust authorities.
Fairness heuristic theory stresses the role of procedural fairness for organization members as an indicator of whether authorities can be trusted not to exploit them. When authorities act fairly, it suggests they are willing to sacrifice some of their own benefits (e.g., as they could obtain by abusing their power) for the benefit of their followers and thus can be trusted not to exploit their followers. Authorities who act unfairly, on the other hand, send a clear signal that they cannot be trusted (Lind, 2001) . In support of this idea, research shows that authorities enacting procedures in an unfair manner are trusted less by their followers (Konovsky & Cropanzano, 1991; Korsgaard et al., 1995) . Moreover, trust explains (mediates) procedural fairness effects on important outcome variables, such as emotions toward the leader , OCB (Konovsky & Pugh, 1994) , and job satisfaction, turnover intentions, and organizational commitment (Aryee, Budhwar, & Chen, 2002) . In sum, trust in authorities is a crucial variable to focus on when studying procedural fairness effects in relation to possible power abuse (cf. Colquitt, Greenberg, & Scott, 2005) .
A second important building block for our argument is how authority power is related to accountability for the (un)fairness with which procedures are enacted. Fairness theory (e.g., Folger & Cropanzano, 2001) notes that an important criterion that followers use to evaluate authorities' accountability for unfairness is "Could the authority have acted differently?" This "could" criterion is relevant to understand the role of authority power as a moderator of procedural fairness effects. More specifically, high authority power suggests that authorities actually control decision-making procedures (i.e., they could have acted differently). This implies that high-power authorities are likely to be held accountable for the fairness of the enacted procedures. We therefore expected followers to base their evaluation of high-power authorities (the decision whether to trust the authority perhaps being the most basic aspect of this evaluation) and subsequent behavior on procedural feedback indicating that the authority acts procedurally fair.
When interacting with low-power authorities, followers may hold such authorities less accountable for the fairness with which procedures are enacted. We expected this because low-power authorities may not be considered as actually controlling the procedures but instead as only participating in their enactment or following orders from higher organizational authorities (i.e., lowpower authorities could not have acted differently). This should make followers less susceptible to procedural feedback when evaluating their relationship with low-power authorities (e.g., as indexed by followers' trust in the authority).
Another important implication from fairness theory is its claim that followers particularly focus on determining accountability for unfairness. This is because procedural fairness refers to norms that followers use to evaluate whether leaders abuse their power (Bies & Tripp, 1995) . Deviations from fairness norms are more impactful than norm-consistent behavior (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001) because deviation (e.g., unfairness) is considered more diagnostic of personal dispositions and, therefore, future behavior than normconsistent, fair behavior (cf. Martijn, Spears, Van der Pligt, & Jakobs, 1992) . In sum, the negative effects of unfairness on trust (among high-power authorities) and on other outcome variables can be expected to be stronger than the positive effects of fairness. Trust theorizing has also recognized the important role of procedural fairness (as a core aspect of authorities' trustworthiness) in the development of trust in authorities (Mayer et al., 1995; see Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007 , for meta-analytic results). Traditionally, trust development has been conceptualized as a gradual increase from low levels of trust to high levels when interaction partners engage in repeated positive interactions. For instance, classic interpretations of interdependence theory (see Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003 , for an overview) note that low-power people often fear exploitation by power holders, suggesting that people will have low trust in power holders. However, recent work shows that this pattern of trust development, in fact, does not occur very often. People often enter relationships with authorities with high levels of initial trust (e.g., Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995; Kramer, 1994 ; for overviews, see Kramer, 2009; McKnight et al., 1998; Weber et al., 2005) , regardless of the power difference (e.g., Giacobbe-Miller, 1995; Korsgaard et al., 1995) . Hence, in terms of the fundamental social dilemma, many people's default orientation is to trust, rather than distrust, authorities (Kramer, 2009) . Trust is lowered when people attribute untrustworthy (e.g., unfair) behavior to authorities, or stabilized when authorities are believed to act in a trustworthy manner. It is interesting to note that high initial trust results particularly when people perceive a situation as normal (i.e., everything is in the proper order; McKnight et al., 1998) . This connects well with our procedural fairness perspective stressing that people expect authorities to comply with fairness norms and thus consider fair behavior as normal (Bies & Tripp, 1995; Folger & Cropanzano, 2001 ).
The Present Research
Integrating the above-described insights from fairness heuristic theory and fairness theory with recent trust development theorizing, we argue that followers will generally have relatively high trust in organizational authorities but that authorities who enact procedures unfairly will undermine their followers' trust. However, such trust undermining as a result of unfairly enacted procedures is expected only when followers hold the authority accountable for the enactment of the procedures, that is, when the authority has high power. When the authority has low power, unfairly enacted procedures will be less likely to harm trust in the authority because low-power authority figures will be held less accountable for their actions. Low-power authorities should therefore generally be trusted relatively strongly among their followers regardless of whether they are procedurally fair.
Further, trust is known to explain (mediate) procedural fairness effects on a variety of important outcome variables (Aryee et al., 2002; Konovsky & Pugh, 1994) . Hence, because we expected the effect of procedural fairness on trust to be stronger when the authority has high power, we also expected effects of procedural fairness on a range of specific outcome measures, as mediated by trust, to be stronger when authority power is high (see Figure 1) . We examined three theoretically and practically relevant outcomes that we expected to be influenced by procedural fairness, via trust in the authority.
The first outcome variable is the authority's legitimacy. Legitimacy refers to acceptance of the authority. Such acceptance can increase the likelihood that followers will accept decisions of such authorities. Procedural fairness is a prime determinant of authorities' legitimacy (Tyler, 2006) . Further, trust mediates procedural fairness effects on legitimacy (Tyler, 1989) , presumably because trust indicates that interacting with a procedurally fair authority is "safe" (De Cremer, 2002 ). Because we predicted that followers' trust is lowered particularly when unfairly acting authorities have high power, we also predicted that the effect of procedural unfairness on legitimacy, as mediated by trust, is stronger when authorities have high power.
We also studied attributions of authorities as charismatic as a variable that is influenced by procedural fairness (among highpower authorities). Charisma is an important source of social influence, and it describes leaders who are clear role models for followers, with high standards of moral and ethical conduct (Conger & Kanungo, 1998) . Procedural fairness increases followers' attributions of charisma to authorities (van Dijke & De Cremer, 2010) , and we included this outcome variable because it is relevant in this context. Specifically, procedurally fair behavior by highpower authorities may be viewed as a form of self-sacrifice, which is a prime behavioral component of charisma (De Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2004) . This is because high-power authorities who act fairly give up certain benefits that they could obtain from abusing their power (Lind, 2001) . Unfair behavior of powerful authorities, on the other hand, is clearly a self-interested act. In line with our argument, we expected trust to mediate the effect of procedural fairness on charisma attributed to the authority because trust not only is positively influenced by procedural fairness but also seems a necessary prerequisite for effective role models (cf. De Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2005) . Because the effect of procedural fairness on trust is expected to be particularly strong when the enacting authority has high power, we also predicted that the effect of procedural fairness on charisma attributed to the authority, as mediated by trust, is particularly strong when the authority has high, rather than low, power.
Finally, we investigated the effect of procedural fairness (among high-power authorities) on followers' extra effort to achieve the organization's goals (OCB), as a behavioral effect of procedural fairness. Studies consistently reveal positive procedural fairness effects on OCB (for meta-analyses, see Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001 ). This effect likely occurs because fairly enacted procedures create a meaningful relationship between authorities and followers, which results in felt obligations for followers to reciprocate (Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, & Taylor, 2000) . Trust, as an index of a meaningful authority-follower relationship, is thus known to mediate procedural fairness effects on OCB (Konovsky & Pugh, 1994) . In sum, because the effect of procedural fairness on trust is expected to be particularly strong when the authority has high power, we also expected the effect of procedural fairness on OCB, as mediated by trust, to be stronger when the authority has high power.
To summarize our argument (see Figure 1) , we first of all expect unfairly enacted procedures to lower trust in the authority, particularly when the authority has high, rather than low, power (Hypothesis 1). Low-power authorities should always receive relatively high trust, regardless of the fairness of the enacted procedures. Second, we predict a moderated mediation model in which procedural fairness indirectly (via trust in the authority) influences perceptions of the authority's legitimacy, charisma attributed to the authority, and follower OCB. These mediated effects are also expected to be most pronounced when authorities have high, rather than low, power (Hypothesis 2).
Overview of the Studies
We tested our predictions in three studies. Study 1 is a crosssectional field study conducted in the Netherlands, with the measurement of all variables derived from the perceptions of the focal employees. We focused on employees' perceptions of their supervisor's legitimacy and charisma as outcome variables because both variables are important for understanding employee behavior (i.e., support for authorities, Tyler, 2006 ; motivation to perform beyond normal expectations, Conger & Kanungo, 1998) .
Study 2 is a laboratory experiment in which participants ostensibly performed a decision-making task with a fellow participant. We manipulated power and procedural fairness of the interaction partner. We measured trust in the interaction partner, attributions of charisma to the partner, and perceived legitimacy of the interaction partner. Study 2 compensates for a shortcoming of Study 1: that cross-sectional data does not allow valid causal conclusions.
Study 3, another field study, but now conducted in the United States, was intended to add to Study 1 and Study 2 by focusing on employees' extra efforts to achieve the group's goals (OCB) as a behavioral effect of procedural fairness. We assessed OCB by asking the opinion of coworkers about the focal employee's behavior. This solves methodological problems that can limit the validity of conclusions based on single-source data and also allows drawing inferences about actual behavior as a procedural fairness effect (as moderated by supervisor power and mediated by trust in the supervisor).
Study 1 Method
Sample and procedure. We invited 570 Dutch members of a research panel who worked for at least 12 hr a week and who had a supervisor to fill out the questionnaire on a web page. For their participation, they received credit points that would allow them to receive certain gifts (e.g., tickets for the movies).
Four hundred and eighty employees filled out the questionnaire (a response rate of 84.2%). Forty percent were male, and 60% were female. Of the respondents, 1% had only lower education (primary school), 20% had followed up on this by secondary education only, 27% had followed up on their secondary education with vocational education, 33% had a bachelor's degree, and 20% had a master's degree. The mean age was 37.67 years (SD ϭ 10.58). The respondents worked, on average, for 31.49 hr (SD ϭ 10.25) each week. They worked, on average, for 7.68 years (SD ϭ 8.35) with their current organization and for 5.55 years (SD ϭ 6.43) in their current job. On average, the respondents had worked in 3.71 jobs (SD ϭ 3.17; including the present one). Twenty-five percent worked for the government, 70% worked for nongovernmental organizations, and 5% worked as temporary employees. Finally, 78% had a permanent contract with their employer, 14% had a prospect toward a permanent contract, and 8% had no prospect toward a permanent contract with their employer.
Measures. We measured perceptions of the supervisor's procedural fairness with Colquitt's (2001) seven-item procedural fairness scale including such items as "To what extent are you able to express your views and feelings during decision-making procedures?" and "To what extent are procedures applied consistently" (1 ϭ to a small extent, 5 ϭ to a large extent; Cronbach's ␣ ϭ .92). The items were introduced with the following sentence: "Please think about your relationship with your immediate supervisor when responding to these items."
We measured trust in the supervisor with the five-item trust-insupervisors scale (e.g., Scott, 1983 ). An example of an item is "I am confident that when I would make a mistake, my supervisor would be willing to forgive and forget" (1 ϭ strongly disagree, 5 ϭ strongly agree; Cronbach's ␣ ϭ .90).
We measured charisma attributions with 10 items taken from Conger and Kanungo (1998) . Examples are "My supervisor is a charismatic person" and "My supervisor is someone who makes you proud to be associated with him or her" (1 ϭ strongly disagree, 5 ϭ strongly agree; Cronbach's ␣ ϭ .90).
We measured the supervisor's legitimacy with Choi and MaiDalton's (1999) four-item legitimacy scale. Because these items originally referred to the president of the company, we changed the wording slightly to have them refer to "my supervisor." Examples are "I accept my supervisor as a leader" and "My supervisor deserves his or her position" (1 ϭ strongly disagree, 5 ϭ strongly agree; Cronbach's ␣ ϭ .94).
We measured supervisor power with eight items from Hinkin and Schriesheim's (1989) "bases of social power" instrument. We used the items assessing coercive and reward power because other power bases are less directly associated with possible exploitation (Kelman, 1974) . Examples are "My supervisor can increase my pay level" and "My supervisor can give me undesirable job assignments" (1 ϭ strongly disagree, 5 ϭ strongly agree; Cronbach's ␣ ϭ .83). On the basis of theoretical arguments and empirical results (e.g., Raven, Schwarzwald, & Koslowsky, 1998) , researchers generally classify coercive and reward power as part of one more general "hard power" construct.
It should be noted that Hinkin and Schriesheim's (1989) coercive and reward power scales often have low intercorrelations, suggesting that they are not caused by one underlying power construct. It therefore seems desirable to treat reward power and coercive power items as causing one underlying power construct. There is considerable debate about the psychometric properties of such causal indicators, although they are widely used in the social sciences (compare, for instance, Bollen, 2007 , with Howell, Breivik, & Wilcox, 2007 . To stay on the safe side of this debate, we followed Howell et al.'s (2007) recommendation and initially modeled coercive and reward power as separate constructs to establish the equivalence of their moderating role. We simultaneously entered the effects of coercive and reward power and their interactions with procedural fairness in the analyses (also in Study 3). These analyses yielded results that were essentially the same as the results of the collapsed scale (see also Mossholder, Bennett, Kemery, & Wesolowski, 1998 , for evidence that Hinkin and Schriesheim's coercive and reward power scales have similar relationships with procedural fairness perceptions). Having established that both types of hard power moderate procedural fairness effects in a similar manner, and in light of the same theoretical rationale that we developed for both types of power, for the sake of parsimony we decided to treat the summary scale as our power indicator.
We included gender (coding male as 1 and female as 2), age, educational level, organization tenure, and job tenure in the analyses as control variables because they relate to employees' status in the organization, which may affect responses to procedural (un)fairness (Aquino et al., 2006; Begley et al., 2006) . Table 1 presents correlations between the scales, means, and standard deviations.
Results and Discussion
Previous work has often assessed mediation (including mediation of a moderated effect) using Baron and Kenny's (1986) approach. This approach, however, is increasingly being criticized for various reasons, such as that it has low statistical power and does not actually test the significance of the mediated effect. Scholars instead recommend directly testing the significance of the mediated effect (e.g., MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002) . This implies estimating whether the product of the relevant regression coefficients (from the independent variable to the mediator and from the mediator to the dependent variable) significantly departs from zero. A limitation of this approach is that it (often incorrectly) assumes that this product is normally distributed. We used a bootstrap procedure advocated by Edwards and Lambert (2007) and Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes (2007) to assess the (moderated) indirect relationships. In this procedure, the initial effect values (B coefficients) are derived from multiple regression analyses. Bootstrapping then generates a sampling distribution of the product term of the B coefficients by randomly sampling sets of cases from the original sample and computing the product term. This procedure is followed 5,000 times in our study. Further corrections are then applied to adjust for differences between the product term derived from the original sample and the median product terms of the bootstrap estimates, resulting in bias-corrected bootstrap intervals.
We were primarily interested in power as a moderator of the relationship between procedural fairness (the independent variable) and trust in the authority (the mediator). However, as a stringent test of our predictions (see Edwards & Lambert, 2007) , we also tested models that, in addition to treating power as a moderator of the procedural fairness-trust relationship, included power as a moderator of the relationship between trust and the dependent variables (charisma and legitimacy perceptions) and directly between procedural fairness and charisma and legitimacy perceptions. The results are presented in Tables 2 and 3 . For the analyses concerning legitimacy and charisma, we present coefficients from the models in which power was included as a moderator of all three paths. Moreover, we present coefficients for the full models (i.e., including main and interaction effects) because adding interaction effects to the models did not affect the significance of the main effects. Trust. As can be observed in Table 2 , none of the background variables were significantly related to trust in the supervisor. Procedural fairness, however, was significantly and positively related to trust (␤ ϭ .20, t ϭ 4.39, p Ͻ .001, f 2 ϭ .04). The analysis also revealed a significant negative relationship between supervisor power and trust (␤ ϭ Ϫ.16, t ϭ 3.37, p Ͻ .001, f 2 ϭ .03). Importantly, trust was significantly related to the interaction of procedural fairness and supervisor power (␤ ϭ .09, t ϭ 1.98, p Ͻ .05, f 2 ϭ .02). Figure 2 visually represents the interaction.
Simple slopes analyses (Aiken & West, 1991;  see Table 3 ) revealed that when the supervisor had low power (one standard deviation below the mean), trust was not significantly related to procedural fairness (B ϭ 0.08, SE ϭ 0.05, t ϭ 1.64, p Ͼ .05, f 2 ϭ .01). However, when the supervisor had high power, the relationship between procedural fairness and trust was significant (one standard deviation above the mean; B ϭ 0.21, SE ϭ 0.05, t ϭ 4.33 p Ͻ .001, f 2 ϭ .04). Charisma attributions. Attributions of the supervisor as charismatic were not significantly related to any of the background variables. However, charisma attributions were significantly related to trust in the supervisor (␤ ϭ .66, t ϭ 18.60, p Ͻ .001, f 2 ϭ .74), to procedural fairness (␤ ϭ .13, t ϭ 3.70, p Ͻ .001, f 2 ϭ .04), to supervisor power (␤ ϭ .11, t ϭ 3.06, p Ͻ .01, f 2 ϭ .02), and to the Procedural Fairness ϫ Supervisor Power interaction (␤ ϭ .08, t ϭ 1.96, p Ͻ .05, f 2 ϭ .01). Bootstrap simple effects tests (see Table  3 ) showed that the indirect relationship between procedural fairness and charisma attributions, via trust, was significantly larger than zero when supervisor power was high (one standard deviation above the mean; indirect B ϭ 0.19, SE ϭ 0.05, z ϭ 3.47, p Ͻ .001, f 2 ϭ .02) but not when power was low (one standard deviation below the mean; indirect B ϭ 0.07, SE ϭ 0.05, z ϭ 1.48, p Ͼ .05, f 2 ϭ .00). Figure 3 depicts the indirect relationship between procedural fairness and charisma perceptions, as mediated by trust, in which supervisor power moderates the relationship between procedural fairness and trust. Legitimacy. Supervisor legitimacy was significantly related to organization tenure (␤ ϭ Ϫ.10, t ϭ Ϫ2.47, p Ͻ .05, f 2 ϭ .01), to supervisor power (␤ ϭ .06, t ϭ 2.00, p Ͻ .05, f 2 ϭ .01), and to trust in the supervisor (␤ ϭ .81, t ϭ 27.10, p Ͻ .001, f 2 ϭ 1.29). Simple effects tests (see Table 4 ) showed that the indirect relationship between procedural fairness and legitimacy, via trust, was significantly larger than zero when supervisor power was high (one standard deviation above the mean; indirect B ϭ 0.22, SE ϭ 0.06, z ϭ 3.69, p Ͻ .001, f 2 ϭ .02) but not when it was low (one standard deviation below the mean; indirect B ϭ 0.09, SE ϭ 0.06, z ϭ 1.51, p Ͼ .05, f 2 ϭ .00). Figure 4 depicts the indirect relationship between procedural fairness and legitimacy, as mediated by trust, in which the path between procedural fairness and trust is moderated by supervisor power.
Trust in low-power supervisors. The previous analyses showed that the slopes for the relationship between procedural fairness and trust and, indirectly, between procedural fairness and legitimacy and charisma perceptions were significantly larger than zero when leaders had high power. This was not the case when leaders had low power. However, our prediction was more specific. We expected procedural unfairness to be associated more with lowered trust than fairness with elevated trust among highpower supervisors. Low-power supervisors should thus receive relatively high levels of trust, regardless of the fairness of the enacted procedures. Inspection of the simple slopes (see Figure 2 ) appears to support this prediction.
As a formal test, we conducted further simple slopes analyses (see Aiken & West, 1991) with supervisor power as the independent variable, procedural fairness as the moderator, and trust as the dependent variable. In line with our expectations, this analysis revealed that among unfair supervisors (one standard deviation below the mean), trust was lower when supervisors had high, compared with low, power (B ϭ Ϫ0.17, SE ϭ 0.05, t ϭ Ϫ3.83, p Ͻ .001, f 2 ϭ .03). When the supervisor was fair (one standard deviation above the mean), trust was not elevated when supervisors had high, rather than low, power (B ϭ Ϫ0.04, SE ϭ 0.05, t ϭ Ϫ0.68, p Ͼ .05, f 2 ϭ .00). Hence, only when high-power supervisors are procedurally unfair is their followers' trust decreased. This also implies that low-power supervisors are always relatively strongly trusted.
Study 2
The results of Study 1 support our predictions. Procedurally unfair supervisors were trusted less, but only when they had high power. Among supervisors with low power, trust in the supervisor was always relatively high, regardless of the fairness with which procedures were enacted. Moreover, and also in line with our predictions, procedural fairness was indirectly related (via trust) to charisma attributed to the authority and the authority's perceived legitimacy, but only when respondents had a high-power supervisor.
Study 2 was a laboratory experiment designed to replicate the findings of Study 1. Participants performed a decision-making task in a simulated organization, ostensibly with a fellow organization member. We manipulated the fellow organization member's power over the participant and the fellow organization member's procedural fairness orthogonally. Trust, legitimacy, and attributions of the fellow organization member as charismatic were measured.
Procedural fairness is often manipulated by allowing (versus denying) participants voice in the decisions of authorities. However, voice refers to the power relationship between authorities and followers (Brockner, Ackerman, & Fairchild, 2001 ). To ensure that we orthogonally manipulated power and procedural fairness, we based our procedural fairness manipulation on the accuracy rule. This is one of Leventhal's (1980) well-known procedural fairness rules, but in contrast to voice, it refers to authority behavior, rather than the authority-follower relationship (Brockner et al., 2001 ). Our manipulation was based on an established accuracy manipulation developed by Vermunt, Wit, van den Bos, and Lind (1996) , which reliably influences fairness evaluations and reactions to (un)fairness.
To manipulate the fellow organization member's power, we manipulated this person's control over the participant's outcomes (a chance at winning €50, approximately $80), which is a commonly used power manipulation (e.g., Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000) . In addition, we stressed the authority aspect of the high-power position by emphasizing the role requirements inherent to this position (adapted from Goodwin et al., 2000, Study 3) .
Method
Participants and design. Eighty undergraduate psychology students (62 women and 18 men; M age ϭ 35.54 years, SD ϭ 9.36) from the Open University of the Netherlands participated in exchange for course credit. They were randomly assigned to a 2 (partner's power: high vs. low) ϫ 2 (partner's procedural fairness: fair vs. unfair) between-subjects factorial design. Procedure. We invited participants to a study on "decisions in organizations" via the university's laboratory network. After agreeing to participate, a pop-up box appeared informing the participants that because the study had to be done in pairs, the laboratory network was searching for another participant. After about 2 min, the participants learned that a fellow participant had been found. In reality, all actions and communications of the fellow participant had been preprogrammed. We explained that the participants would work with another participant on a decisionmaking task in a simulated organization for about half an hour. Communication would take place via the network. Their privacy and anonymity were guaranteed. After that, the participants filled out a 20-item test that ostensibly assessed their decision-making style.
Then we explained that the task would involve buying stocks in a simulated investment firm (this task is regularly used in power research; see van Dijke & Poppe, 2006 , for an overview). The organization members would receive information about the value of the respective stock and decide how many stocks to buy on the basis of that information. We conveyed information by means of a graph showing the value of a certain stock for each of the last 10 weeks. Then we presented participants with an example of such a graph.
We explained that although the buying decisions were to be made individually, we formed pairs of organization members because most organizations consist of more than one person. After the task, the organization members would rate each other's performance, and one of the organization members would communicate the performance scores to us. We also explained that about 100 students would participate in this study. The participant with the overall best performance would receive €50 (approximately $80). We explained that the other's performance could be rated in two ways. First, one could add the scores on the decision-style test that the organization members had previously filled out. We presented this as a quick but unreliable way to rate performance. Alternatively, performance could be rated by means of evaluating the buying decisions that the other person would make later on. We introduced this as a reliable but time-consuming way to rate performance; for each stock, actual buying decisions had to be compared with an expert solution. Further, to integrate the performance ratings over the buying decisions, one needed to use a complex formula. Then we told participants that when the stock task was finished, they would receive an overview of their fellow organization member's test scores and buying decisions. At this point, they would also receive a more detailed explanation of how the actual rating was to be performed.
We explained that we assigned the organization member who logged on first to the laboratory network to the position that included the responsibility of informing the experimenters about the performance scores of both organization members. This would be an important position because this member would have a second look at the performance scores of both persons. This organization member could ask his or her partner to do the scoring again, if he or she felt that was necessary. Then we introduced the power manipulation. In the condition in which the other organization member had high power over the participant, this organization member was assigned to the position of communicating the performance scores to the experimenter. In the condition in which the other organization member had low power over the participant, the participant was assigned to the position of communicating the scores. Following this explanation, an e-mail screen appeared asking participants to write a message to their fellow organization member to ensure effective cooperation. We suggested that they could briefly tell something about themselves or indicate which scoring method they preferred. About one and a half minutes after sending the e-mail supposedly to their fellow organization member, the participants received e-mail, supposedly from their fellow organization member, that contained our manipulation of the fellow organization member's procedural fairness (accuracy). Participants in the procedurally fair condition read Hello, This seems like a neat study, don't you think? I will take my time on it because I am in no rush and don't have anywhere to be now. When scoring your performance, I will not look at the items of the test that we just filled out. I will just score your performance on the stock task. That takes a lot of time, but I think it is the best way to do it.
Good luck!
In the unfair condition, participants read Hello, This seems like a neat study, don't you think? I have to leave soon, so I don't have much time. I cannot score your performance on the stock buying task. That will take too much time. I will just quickly add your scores on the items of the test we just filled out.
After that, the participants, and supposedly their fellow organization members, proceeded with the stock buying task. This task consisted of 10 trials. On each trial, a graph depicting the value of the stock was shown together with a buying screen and an overview of the budget that the participant had left to spend.
After the 10 trials, and supposedly before the performance rating task, the participants were asked to respond to some items asking their opinion of the situation and their partner. Their responses would not be visible to their partner. At this point, we solicited the manipulation checks and dependent measures. Then we told the participants that it was not necessary to score one another's performance and that this was the end of the study. Finally, we fully explained the aims and procedure of the experiment to the participants, and asked them not to talk to others about the study.
Manipulation checks and dependent measures. We assessed all items on 5-point scales (1 ϭ completely disagree, 5 ϭ completely agree).
To check on the procedural fairness manipulation, we asked whether the participants agreed with "My fellow student treated me in a fair manner." To check on the power manipulation, we asked whether participants agreed with "My fellow student has more influence than I have on the final performance scores" and "My fellow student has a lot of influence on the final performance scores."
We measured trust in the fellow student with five items (based on Scott, 1983, and . Examples are "I trust my fellow student" and "My fellow student will probably take advantage of me" (reversed; Cronbach's ␣ ϭ .75, M ϭ 3.22, SD ϭ 0.51).
We measured charisma attributions with six items (adapted from Pearce & Sims, 2002) . Examples are "My fellow student inspires me to bring out the best of myself" and "My fellow student has vision" (Cronbach's ␣ ϭ .69, M ϭ 2.98, SD ϭ 0.41).
We measured legitimacy with three items adapted from Choi and Mai-Dalton (1999) : "I accept my fellow student in this position," "My fellow student deserves this position," and "My fellow student is capable for this position" (Cronbach's ␣ ϭ .86, M ϭ 3.26, SD ϭ 0.56).
Results and Discussion
Manipulation checks. A 2 ϫ 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) with procedural fairness and other's power as independent variables on the item assessing whether the participant believed the fellow student acted fairly revealed that in the procedurally fair conditions, participants indicated that the other acted more fairly (M ϭ 3.62, SD ϭ 0.54) than in the procedurally unfair conditions (M ϭ 3.27, SD ϭ 0.71), F(1, 76) ϭ 4.81, p Ͻ .05, 2 ϭ .06, f ϭ .26. No other effects were significant.
A 2 ϫ 2 ANOVA with procedural fairness and other's power as independent variables on the item asking whether participants believed that their fellow student had more influence over the final performance scores revealed that in the conditions in which the other had high power, participants indicated that the other student had more influence on the performance scores (M ϭ 3.13, SD ϭ 0.67) than when the other had low power (M ϭ 2.56, SD ϭ 0.92), F(1, 76) ϭ 10.92, p Ͻ .001, 2 ϭ .13, f ϭ .39. No other effects were significant. Another 2 ϫ 2 ANOVA with procedural fairness and other's power as independent variables on the item assessing whether participants believed their fellow student had a lot of influence over the final performance scores revealed that in the conditions in which the other had high power, participants indicated that the other student had more influence on the performance scores (M ϭ 3.26, SD ϭ 0.55) than when the other had low power (M ϭ 3.00, SD ϭ 0.71), F(1, 76) ϭ 4.02, p Ͻ .05, 2 ϭ .05, f ϭ .24. No other effects were significant. We tested our hypotheses using the same bootstrap moderated mediation procedures as in Study 1. The results are presented in Tables 4 and 5 .
Trust. As can be seen in Table 4 , procedural fairness had a significant positive effect on trust in the fellow organization member (␤ ϭ .24, t ϭ 2.08, p Ͻ .05, 2 ϭ .05 f ϭ .24). Moreover, this effect was qualified by a significant interaction effect of procedural fairness and power (␤ ϭ .26, t ϭ 2.27, p Ͻ .05, 2 ϭ .06, f ϭ .26). Figure 5 illustrates the interaction. Simple effects tests showed that procedurally fair partners were trusted more than unfair partners, but this effect was significant only when the interaction partner had high power over the participant (M fair ϭ 3.52, SD ϭ 0.36 vs. M unfair ϭ 2.97, SD ϭ 0.60; B ϭ 0.26, SE ϭ 0.09, t ϭ 2.94, p Ͻ .01, 2 ϭ .10, f ϭ .36) rather than low power (M fair ϭ 3.27, SD ϭ 0.36 vs. M unfair ϭ 3.33, SD ϭ 0.49; B ϭ Ϫ0.01, SE ϭ 0.08, t ϭ Ϫ0.14, p Ͼ .05, 2 ϭ .00, f ϭ .00). Charisma attributions. Attributions of the fellow student as charismatic were significantly related only to trust in the fellow student (␤ ϭ .53, t ϭ 5.14, p Ͻ .001, f ϭ .56). Bootstrap simple effects tests (see Table 5 ) showed that the indirect effect of procedural fairness on charisma attributions, via trust, was significantly larger than zero when the fellow student had high power (indirect B ϭ 0.19, SE ϭ 0.09, z ϭ 1.96, p Ͻ .05, f ϭ .28) rather than low power (indirect B ϭ Ϫ0.01, SE ϭ 0.11, z ϭ Ϫ0.08, p Ͼ .05, f ϭ .00). Figure 6 shows the indirect effect of procedural fairness on charisma perceptions, as mediated by trust, in which the path between procedural fairness and trust is moderated by supervisor power.
Legitimacy. The fellow organization member's legitimacy was significantly related only to trust in this person (␤ ϭ .60, t ϭ 6.55, p Ͻ .001). Simple effects tests (see Table 5 ) showed that the indirect effect of procedural fairness on legitimacy, via trust, was significantly larger than zero when the fellow organization member had high power (indirect B ϭ 0.31, SE ϭ 0.12, z ϭ 2.56, p Ͻ .05, f ϭ .27), but not when this person had low power (indirect B ϭ Ϫ0.01, SE ϭ 0.09, z ϭ Ϫ0.16, p Ͼ .05, f ϭ .00). Figure 7 depicts the indirect effect of procedural fairness on legitimacy, as mediated by trust, in which the path between procedural fairness and trust is moderated by the fellow organization member's power.
Low-power interaction partners. The effects of procedural fairness on trust and, indirectly, on legitimacy and charisma attributions were significantly positive when the fellow organization member had high, rather than low, power. In addition, we predicted that procedural unfairness is more likely to lower trust than high fairness is to elevate trust (among high-power authorities). Hence, low-power fellow organization members should always be trusted relatively strongly, regardless of their fairness. Mirroring the moderated mediation analysis, a 2 ϫ 2 ANOVA with procedural fairness and the partner's power as independent variables and trust as dependent variable revealed a significant interaction effect of procedural fairness and other's power, F(1, 76) ϭ 5.31, p Ͻ .05, 2 ϭ .06, f ϭ .25. Simple effects tests showed that high-power partners were trusted less than low-power partners when they acted procedurally unfair, F(1, 76) ϭ 4.45, p Ͻ .05, 2 ϭ .06, f ϭ .24. When the partner acted in a fair manner, this person's power did not significantly influence the participant's trust, F(1, 76) ϭ 1.30, p Ͼ .05, 2 ϭ .02, f ϭ .14. In sum, low-power interaction partners were always relatively strongly trusted, regardless of their fairness. And trust in high-power interaction partners was harmed only when they acted in a procedurally unfair manner. 
Study 3
The results of Study 2 again support our expectations, but this time in a controlled experiment. Procedural unfairness negatively influenced trust in the interaction partner and, via trust, also the partner's legitimacy and charisma, but only among respondents who had a high-power interaction partner. When the interaction partner had low power, trust, and consequently legitimacy and charisma, were always relatively high, regardless of procedural fairness. Study 1 and Study 2 thus yield converging evidence that procedural fairness effects on psychological outcome variables are found particularly when the authority has high power.
Study 3 was another field study that differed in two noteworthy ways from Study 1. First, Study 3 adds to Study 1 (and Study 2) by including a behavioral, rather than a psychological, outcome variable (OCB). Second, from a methodological point of view, an improvement of Study 3 over Study 1 (and Study 2) was that we obtained the data from two sources: our focal employees (who assessed their supervisor's procedural fairness and power, and also indicated their trust in their supervisor) and our focal employees' coworkers (who assessed our focal employees' OCB).
Method
Sample and procedure. Two hundred and eighteen individuals-109 focal employees and their matched coworkersparticipated in the study. Participants were from a variety of organizations in southeastern United States, including technology, government, insurance, financial, food service, retail, manufacturing, and medical organizations. The focal employees were 54% male and 69% Caucasian (7% Hispanic, 5% African American, 6% Latino, 3% biracial, and 6% Asian American; 4% indicated "another racial background"). The mean age was 23.35 years (SD ϭ 5.38). Two percent of the respondents indicated having only lower education (high school), 65% had some college experience, 30% had a college degree, and 3% were in graduate school. Seventy percent worked part-time, and 30% worked full-time. The respondents worked, on average, for 2.10 years (SD ϭ 2.00) with their current organization. The respondents' primary work group consisted, on average, of 13.50 members (SD ϭ 13.02). Seventyeight percent indicated having a nonmanagement job, 6% indicated having a line management job, 8% indicated having a middle management job, 1% indicated having a senior management position, and 6% indicated having "another position."
The coworkers were 60% male. Sixty-eight percent were Caucasian (8% Hispanic, 6% African American, 9% Latino, 2% biracial, and 7% Asian American; 1% indicated "another racial background"). Nine percent of the coworkers indicated having only lower education (high school), 41% had some college experience, 34% had a college degree, 8% were in graduate school, and 7% had a master's degree. Seventy-two percent of the coworkers indicated having a nonmanagement job, 11% indicated having a line management job, 12% indicated having a middle management job, and 6% indicated having "another position." Sixty-eight percent of the coworkers worked part-time, and 32% worked fulltime. They averaged 29.3 years (SD ϭ 10.62) of age with 4.2 years (SD ϭ 4.83) of experience working in their organizations.
We recruited participants using a snowball sampling procedure (e.g., Grant & Mayer, 2009; Morgeson & Humphrey, 2006; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997) . Researchers sent an electronic message to 232 undergraduate business major students and asked them to help with a study for extra credit. Students who worked at least 20 hr per week in a job were allowed to participate in the study; if they did not, they were asked to invite a family member or close other to complete the survey. One hundred and nine focal employees participated (a response rate of 47%). We instructed focal employees to visit a website to complete a survey and to send an electronic survey link to a coworker familiar with their work. We assured respondents that their responses would remain confidential. Focal employees completed measures of their supervisor's power, their perceptions of procedural fairness, and their trust in their supervisor. Coworkers provided ratings of each focal employee's OCB.
Measures. All items employed the same 7-point rating scale format (1 ϭ strongly disagree, 7 ϭ strongly agree).
We measured perceptions of the leader's procedural fairness with the same Colquitt (2001) procedural fairness scale as in Study 1 (Cronbach's ␣ ϭ .92). To measure trust in the supervisor, we used 11 items taken from Scott (1983) and Desmet, De Cremer, and van Dijk (2007; Cronbach's ␣ ϭ .96) . To measure supervisor power, we used the same eight items from Hinkin and Schriesheim (1989) as in Study 1 (Cronbach's ␣ ϭ .80).
We assessed OCB using Smith, Organ, and Near's (1983) five-item OCB helping scale. These five items were filled out by the focal respondents' coworker (Cronbach's ␣ ϭ .92). We included gender (coding female as 0 and male as 1), age, education level, and organization tenure in the analyses because these variables relate to one's status in the organization, which may influence people's reactions to procedural fairness (Aquino et al., 2006; Begley et al., 2006) . Moreover, we included the size of the primary work group as a control variable because our OCB measure refers to helping fellow group members.
Results and Discussion
The correlations between the different scales are presented in Table 6 , together with the means and standard deviations. We used the same bootstrap moderated mediation analyses that were employed in Study 1 and Study 2 to test our hypotheses.
Trust. As is shown in Table 7 , procedural fairness was significantly and positively related to trust (␤ ϭ .43, t ϭ 5.48, p Ͻ .001, f 2 ϭ .28). Moreover, the analysis revealed a significant interaction of procedural fairness and supervisor power (␤ ϭ .20, t ϭ 2.21, p Ͻ .05, f 2 ϭ .07). Figure 8 illustrates the interaction. Simple slopes analyses (Aiken & West, 1991) revealed that when supervisors had low power (one standard deviation below the mean), trust was significantly related to procedural fairness (␤ ϭ .29, t ϭ 2.31, p Ͻ .05, f 2 ϭ .06). However, when supervisors had high power (one standard deviation above the mean), the relationship between procedural fairness and trust was clearly stronger (␤ ϭ .43, t ϭ 4.77, p Ͻ .001, f 2 ϭ .39). OCB. OCB was significantly related only to trust in the supervisor (␤ ϭ .33, t ϭ 2.39, p Ͻ .05). Bootstrap simple effects tests (see Table 8 ) showed that the indirect relationship between procedural fairness and OCB, via trust, was significantly larger than zero when supervisor power was high (one standard deviation above the mean; indirect B ϭ 0.17, SE ϭ 0.08, z ϭ 1.96, p Ͻ .05, f 2 ϭ .04), but not when power was low (one standard deviation below the mean; indirect B ϭ 0.13, SE ϭ 0.10, z ϭ 1.66, p Ͼ .05, f 2 ϭ .01). Figure 9 shows the indirect relationship between procedural fairness and OCB, as mediated by trust, in which the relationship between procedural fairness and trust is moderated by supervisor power. Low-power supervisors. As in Studies 1 and 2, we wanted to establish whether procedural unfairness is particularly likely to decrease trust when leaders have high, rather than low, power. This would imply that low-power supervisors are always trusted relatively strongly. We tested whether the negative relationship between supervisor power and trust would be most pronounced when this supervisor was unfair. In line with our expectations, these simple slopes analyses showed that when supervisors were unfair (one standard deviation below the mean), supervisor power and trust in the supervisor were significantly negatively related (B ϭ Ϫ0.22, SE ϭ 0.10, t ϭ Ϫ2.27, p Ͻ .05, f 2 ϭ .05). However, when the supervisor was fair (one standard deviation above the mean), the relationship between supervisor power and trust was not significant (B ϭ 0.12, SE ϭ 0.11, t ϭ 1.22, p Ͼ .05, f 2 ϭ .01). As in Studies 1 and 2, low-power interaction partners were thus always relatively strongly trusted, regardless of their fairness. Trust in high-power interaction partners was harmed only when they enacted procedures unfairly.
General Discussion
Three studies, conducted in two countries-the Netherlands (Studies 1 and 2) and the United States (Study 3)-reveal converging evidence for our idea that unfairly enacted procedures decrease trust in the authority particularly when authorities have high power over their followers. Low-power authorities always received relatively high trust, regardless of the fairness of the enacted procedures. Moreover, as expected, for high-power authorities, procedural fairness has clear effects, mediated by trust, on perceptions of authorities' legitimacy, charisma attributed to authorities, and employees' extra effort to achieve organizational goals (OCB). Thus, the present research represents some important extensions of the literature integrating procedural fairness and power.
Theoretical Implications
Procedural fairness has been recognized conceptually and empirically as a core component of authority's trustworthiness and thus as a central antecedent of trust in the authority (Colquitt et al., 2007; Mayer et al., 1995) . In their integrative closing chapter of the Handbook of Organizational Justice, Colquitt et al. (2005) nominated trust in the authority as a prime candidate for the "ultimate goal" that people have for caring about procedural fairness. They also noted that an important question that remains for fairness research is "To what extent is justice bounded by hierarchical authority relationships?" (p. 596). The present research helps clarify conceptually why trust is such a central fairness concern by addressing the role of authority power in this process. Authority power is a defining aspect of hierarchical authority relationships. Trust in authorities reflects acceptance of vulnerability (e.g., Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998) and thus directly refers to an assessment of power abuse in the authority-follower relationship. In sum, the present research suggests that a number of important procedural fairness effects are pronounced particularly in hierarchical authority relationships because procedural fairness influences trust, and consequently important outcome variables, less strongly when authorities have low power.
The present findings also highlight the tension between classic and contemporary trust development theorizing. Classic trust development theorizing suggests that people fear abuse from powerful interaction partners. They should thus approach authorities with initial low trust. However, recent conceptualizations of trust development (Kramer, 2009; Weber et al., 2005 ; see also McKnight et al., 1998) note that people often enter relationships with others, such as authorities, with high levels of trust. This high trust should then decrease when people attribute accountability to authorities for unfair procedures, and trust will stabilize when authorities enact procedures in a fair manner. The present findings clearly favor recent trust development models over classic versions, at least for the important case of trust development in organized collectives such as organizations. As for fairness heuristic theory, the present findings suggest that in the fundamental social dilemma between trusting and distrusting others, many people's default orientation is to trust authorities and to invest in the collective.
The role of trust in explaining procedural fairness effects on important outcome variables among high-, rather than low-, power authorities also shows the value of the present research, relative to prior work on (proxies of) follower power (i.e., follower hierarchical position or follower influence in authorities' decisions) as a moderator of procedural fairness effects. This research showed that procedural fairness positively influences low-power followers' work attitudes and behaviors, presumably because procedural fairness enhances low-power follower's sense of control by suggesting that their long-term decision outcomes will be positive. It is interesting that studies of this type that included trust in the authority as an outcome variable never found evidence that follower power moderates the effect of procedural fairness on trust (Begley et al., 2006; Korsgaard et al., 1995) . This is understandable because the fairness with which an accountable authority enacts procedures is informative of this authority's trustworthiness, regardless of followers' power. More importantly, this implies that follower power and leader power moderate procedural fairness effects via a clearly different process: Low follower power makes procedural fairness effects stronger because fair procedures increase followers' sense of control. High leader power makes procedural fairness effects stronger because fair procedures make followers more willing to accept vulnerability.
Our findings also have implications for our understanding of high authority power. The nature of power is commonly painted in rather bleak terms. It is often stressed that power easily (or according to some, even automatically) leads to abuse and exploitation (e.g., Fiske, 1993) . Research and theorizing that have addressed cooperation with authorities have thus viewed power as an ineffective source of social influence because it requires large resources to monitor subordinates and to keep them compliant (Tyler, 2006) . In fact, it has been argued that the very nature of power stirs up followers' resistance to authorities' decisions and thus decreases productive behaviors (Willer, Lovaglia, & Markovsky, 1997 ). The present research suggests that such analyses present a simplified picture of followers' reactions to authority power because authority perceptions and employees' voluntary cooperation (i.e., OCB) are decreased only when high-power authorities enact procedures unfairly.
Our results have equally relevant implications for our understanding of the effects of low power on authorities. Researchers have often assumed that people are driven by a need for power over others. Recent research has qualified this claim by suggesting that people want power over others because this increases their freedom to act as they please (van Dijke & Poppe, 2006) . The present findings suggest that high power does not necessarily increase authorities' freedom to act at will. In fact, high power may restrict authorities' freedom because being unfair negatively affects their endorsement as well as their followers' OCB, directly decreasing authorities' effectiveness. Somewhat disturbingly, lowpower authorities may have more freedom to act as they please, without any negative consequences for their endorsement and their followers' behavior because followers do not attribute unfair procedures to the actions of low-power authorities.
A final theoretical implication that we mention derives from finding that procedural fairness influences attributions of authorities' charisma (via trust) particularly among high-power authorities. This finding suggests important consequences for how people construct an image of authorities as a function of authorities' fair versus unfair behavior, and thus how procedural fairness relates to leadership. When authorities have high power, procedurally fair behavior may be viewed as a form of self-sacrifice (which is a key behavioral component of charisma; De Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2004 ) because authorities give up benefits associated with using (or abusing) their power. Unfairly acting authorities, on the other hand, focus on their own benefits, at the expense of their followers. Viewing procedurally fair behavior as a form of selfsacrifice forms a new explanation for the well-established finding that procedurally fair authorities can motivate employees to perform beyond normal expectations (Konovsky & Pugh, 1994) , something that was further supported in Study 3, which had follower OCB as an outcome variable.
Practical Implications
A first important practical implication for managers is that procedural fairness may not always matter. Managers who have relatively little power are less likely to influence their subordinates' trust, engender favorable perceptions of their legitimacy and charisma, and stimulate OCB by being procedurally fair. In fact, with other variables held constant, low-power managers can expect relatively high levels of trust from their employees, regardless of their fairness. Variations in managers' power over their followers should thus be taken into account. Some supervisors, for instance, can determine their followers' salary, whereas others are bound by union-negotiated salary agreements. Moreover, manager's power over employees may vary as a function of the number of rival job opportunities that employees have (cf. Emerson, 1962) . All of this implies that low authority power is a common phenomenon, and for such managers, the use of procedural fairness is less likely to influence a variety of positive outcomes typically associated with the use of fair procedures.
Obviously, managers often cannot afford to have low power over their subordinates because power is often necessary to achieve the organization's goals (Pfeffer, 1992) . High-power managers, however, should ensure that they enact procedures fairly. If they do not, they may hamper their employees' willingness to voluntarily accept their decisions and performance beyond normal expectations. In fact, they may even stimulate employees to seek ways to restrict their power (Emerson, 1962) . Organizations can attempt to avoid these negative consequences by encouraging managers to develop sources of power that less clearly lead to fear of exploitation, such as referent power (French & Raven, 1959 ).
An alternative way to view our results is that low-power managers receive less feedback from their subordinates regarding the consequences of their unfairness, and thus regarding their effectiveness. This can have serious negative consequences because other actors besides direct subordinates, such as job applicants or clients of the organization, may react negatively to low-power managers' procedural unfairness (e.g., because they have less information about the manager's power and are thus more likely to hold the manager accountable), thus decreasing the organization's image and attractiveness. In sum, it seems important to train low as well as high-power managers to enact procedures in a fair manner (Skarlicki & Latham, 2005) , in order to avoid the negative consequences of unfairness.
Strengths and Limitations
An important strength of the present research is that we combined different research methods to rigorously test our predictions. First, we used a single-source cross-sectional survey to assess whether procedural fairness is related to charisma attributed to the supervisor and supervisor legitimacy (when the authority has high power) and whether this is mediated by trust. Such research cannot be used to arrive at valid causal conclusions. Moreover, common method variance may limit the value of such data. However, common method variance may not be a significant problem in organizational research (Crampton & Wagner, 1994) , and it cannot account for interaction effects (Evans, 1985) , which were of primary interest in the present research. We also included Study 2 as a laboratory replication of Study 1. Together, these studies increase our confidence in the internal and external validity of our proposed relationships. Including Study 3, in which we obtained data from different sources, not only allows us to definitely rule out common method variance concerns but also allows a test of our argument using a behavioral outcome variable (OCB).
The interactive effects in the field studies were relatively small in size. However, such effects are usually even smaller in field studies and therefore hard to detect (Aguinis, Beaty, Boik, & Pierce, 2005) . There are methodological reasons for this (e.g., lack of control) as well as statistical reasons (i.e., measurement error in the independent variable and the moderator is compounded when both variables are multiplied to obtain the interaction term; McClelland & Judd, 1993) . Hence, a number of authors (e.g., Evans, 1985) have noted that because moderator effects are suppressed in this type of methodology and analysis, even small effect sizes should be considered important. Further, we believe that even when the true population effects would equal our observed effects, our findings are relevant because authorities often supervise a number of employees. Hence, when high-power authorities enact procedures unfairly, they harm the trust of every employee they supervise. This idea may have the clearest implications for authorities high in the hierarchy. Such authorities are likely to be perceived as having strong control over procedures-and thus held accountable-by large numbers of employees. This gives high-ranking authorities the potential to hurt the organization as a whole even by decreasing individual followers' trust only slightly.
Conclusion
Taken together, our research shows that powerful authorities who act unfairly are less likely to engender trust among their followers and subsequently are viewed less favorably and are less likely to inspire behavior aimed at helping the organization from their followers. In sum, the present research extends the procedural fairness literature as well as the emerging literature integrating procedural fairness and power.
